

SESSION 1

Regional Security Organizations and Peacekeeping. Trends and Challenges

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Peacekeeping Operations and Human Security

SUMMARY: 1. The notion of human security. – 2. The role of human security in PKO. – 3. The development of the impact of human security on PKO. – 4. Human security and EU peace missions.

1. The notion of human security

The role of human security has been frequently referred to with respect to Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs),¹ though mostly as a generic and obvious connotation of such activities, it being more than natural that an operation aiming at keeping and consolidating peace must have a connection with the security of the communities targeted by the operation. However, is human security a component of PKO? Is it their goal? And, which role is it called to play?

Any answer to these questions requires a preliminary clarification of the notion of human security, an expression which has received increasing attention in the recent practice concerned with maintaining peace – or with building it in the aftermath of armed conflicts – as well as with establishing the rule of law in countries plagued by armed conflicts – mainly non-international conflicts – and with protecting countries from external threats. But what is exactly the content and context of this notion, which is frequently invoked, but is still looking for a precise definition?

A reference to human security was introduced for the first time in the 1994

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¹ The expression “peacekeeping operations” as employed here encompasses peace operations in general, irrespective of their actual specific denomination, as the plurality of tasks assigned to them do not appear to allow currently for a clear distinction based on denominations such as “peacekeeping”, “peacebuilding”, or even merely “political” “operations”.

UNDP Human Development Report,² and the need to define it was affirmed in paragraph 143 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome.³ Later, United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 64/291⁴ recognized the need to continue the discussion on human security and to achieve an agreement on the definition thereof. However, it was only with Resolution 66/290⁵ that a common understanding on the notion of human security emerged. According to this resolution, human security includes: the right of people to live in freedom and dignity free from poverty and despair; the recognition of the inter-linkages between peace, development and all human rights, bearing in mind that “achieving development is a central goal in itself and the advancement of human security should contribute to realizing sustainable development as well as the internationally agreed development goals”; and a call for people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities. Additionally, it is characterized by national ownership and, since its conditions vary across and within countries, it aims at strengthening national solutions, which are compatible with local realities. In this context, while States retain the primary role and responsibility for ensuring the survival, livelihood and dignity of their citizens, human security requires greater collaboration and partnerships among governments, international and regional organizations and civil society. Significantly, however, the resolution states that while human security must be implemented with full respect for the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, it “does not entail additional legal obligations on the part of States”.⁶

Following this common understanding, there is no doubt that human security is a newly introduced concept, which builds on the concept of human rights by recalling their aims to ensure freedom from fear and freedom from want and by shifting the accent on the security of individuals and groups as such rather than on the State within which they live. Thus, it is well distinguished from State security and does not replace it. But is it also distinct from the concept of human rights, at least to the extent that its legal scope is far from being thoroughly defined and, consequently, no ways and means of en-

² UN Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994: new Dimensions of Human Security*, at 3, concluding that “it is now time to make a transition from the narrow concept of national security to the all-encompassing concept of human security”.

³ A/RES/60/1, 16 September 2005. On the development of the notion of human security in the UN General Assembly see M. WÄHLISCH, *Human Security: Concept and Evolution in the United Nations*, *Max Planck Yearbook of UN Law*, 2014, at p. 11 ff.

⁴ A/RES/64/291, 16 July 2010.

⁵ A/RES/66/290, 25 October 2012.

⁶ A/RES/66/290, 25 October 2012, para. 3(h).

forcement could be envisaged so far.⁷ Therefore, human security is still a political, rather than a legal notion, which plays an increasingly significant role in political negotiations and has been given a place in international documents and resolutions with a view to enhance the promotion and protection of individuals and communities.

Despite the absence of a precise and concise definition, human security and its common understanding provide the parameters for its application and have been regarded as central to the activities of the UN system. As a recent Report of the Secretary-General on human security recognizes, the human security approach is an added value, including within the framework of the post-2015 development agenda, such that the enhancement of its mainstreaming into the activities of the UN system should be promoted.⁸

2. *The role of human security in PKO*

Coming now to the role of human security in PKO, there is an increasingly shared view that it should be promoted, as an essential feature of such operations. But why has it become so important? And, why may a complex description thereof be not sufficient anymore, and require a more precise definition suitable to envisage the provision of legal obligations of States in its implementation?

It appears that the current trend towards the affirmation and the development of human security as a component of PKO, which emerged as of the last decade of the past century and reached a significant dimension in the first years of the new millennium, is depending on the evolution of the notions of peace and security in recent years, which are in turn connected with the changes in the practice and features of contemporary armed conflicts. With respect to the latter, it is just a matter of fact and a common observation that armed conflicts have become more and more non-international (NIAC) as opposed to international (IAC) as they were in the past. Our world is more frequently witnessing a confrontation between the armed forces of a State and the armed forces of non-State actors than an open confrontation between armed forces belonging to different States. This development does not mean that international features of the said conflicts have entirely disappeared. It is just the opposite.

⁷ See A.I. KIHARA-HUNT, *UN Peace Operations: From National Security to Human Rights and Human Security*, in S. TAKAHASCHI (ed.), *Human Rights, human security, and state security: the intersection* (ed.), ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara (CA), 2014, at p. 245; see also, on the interaction of human security and human rights, D. ESTRADA-TANCK, *Human Security and Human Rights under International Law*, Hart Publishing, Portland (OR), 2016.

⁸ A/68/685, 23 December 2013, *Follow-up to General Assembly resolution 66/290 on human security. Report of the Secretary-General*, para. 67.

First, there are sometimes mixed situations, where IAC and NIAC co-exist and it may be difficult to distinguish when and where an on-going armed conflict is international or non-international. The conflict, or rather the conflicts, which occurred in the Balkans during the last decade of the last century represented one of those situations. It is sufficient to recall the practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the difficulty it encountered in assessing, in each given case, the nature of the conflict for the purposes of selecting the applicable international humanitarian law (IHL) to the criminal responsibility of the accused brought before it under the resolutions of the UN Security Council which established its jurisdiction.⁹

Second, in a NIAC there may be indirect involvement of other States than the State within whose boundaries the conflict occurs. Although these States do not take part in the hostilities with their armed forces, they may support one of the belligerent entities (the State or non-State formations), providing them with, for example, weaponry or technical assistance. This assistance may not necessarily change the legal nature of the conflict as a NIAC, but there is no doubt that the factual involvement of other States politically confers to the conflict an international dimension.

Finally, and more importantly, even when a NIAC is merely domestic, without external interference, it still has an international feature, in that it is governed by international law. Unlike in the past, where a domestic conflict was a purely internal matter to be dealt with and settled under national law, the evolution of international law, including of human rights law, has made the conduct of hostilities in a NIAC a matter of international concern, which entails the applicability of IHL and of International Human Rights Law, and the obligation to respect them both on the part of the State and of the non-State actors which engage in an armed conflict within a country.

3. *The development of the impact of human security on PKO*

Irrespective of the impact on the significance that these considerations may suggest on the characterization of a conflict as an IAC or a NIAC, it is a fact that the increasing occurrence of NIAC has also led to variations in the scope and the meaning recognized to the notions of peace and security with respect to PKO.

As far as peace is concerned, the traditional view that peace is essentially, if not exclusively, linked to and achieved with the end of the hostilities required a profound revision. While a peace agreement putting an end to the

⁹ See on this issue in general ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 71 ff.

fighting between two or more States may satisfy the conditions for peace in the context of an IAC, where the belligerent States are the sole entities having ownership over domestic affairs and bear the entire responsibility thereon, it clearly will not satisfy the requirements for a durable peace in a country where an internal armed conflict took place, especially if it was conducted for a long period of time, the international community being also responsible for re-establishing legal and factual conditions for the domestic population(s) to live in peace. A decision halting the hostilities will not be sufficient to create a domestic order inspired by democratic principles and the respect for the rule of law. In other terms, as the Brahimi Report indicated, the function of peacekeepers as a force to maintain a secure local environment becomes inseparable from the function of peace-builders as a force to maintaining such environment inspired by the rule of law.¹⁰ Thus, a PKO – conducted by the UN or a regional organization – cannot limit itself to intervene to settle the military confrontation, and is expected to address a number of other issues that will require a non-military approach, though they may benefit of the support deriving from the military framework of the operation. As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan put it, “We must [...] broaden our view of what is meant by peace and security. Peace means much more than the absence of war. Human security can no longer be understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law. [...] Peace must also be sought as something that exists not just among nations, but within them as well”.¹¹

In the same line of reasoning, the concept of security is also affected by the non-international nature of the most part of contemporary armed conflicts. While in the context of an IAC security means creating the conditions for preventing the resurgence of the hostilities between the States concerned, and for ensuring external security of the borders these countries; in a NIAC it includes the promotion of an internal legal, economic and social order where human beings may live peacefully and enjoy internationally recognized human rights without undue restriction. In other terms, security is not only freedom from fear, but acquires the positive connotations that come under the umbrella of human security.

This new vision of security does not mean, of course, that the traditional approach to security is or should be set aside. Rather, it shows that that approach is nowadays insufficient to respond to the current needs and perspec-

¹⁰ *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, UN doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.

¹¹ K.A. ANNAN, *Towards a culture of peace*, in F. MAYOR-R.-POL DROIT (eds.), *Letters to future generations*, Unesco Publishing, Paris, 1999, at p. 15.

tives of international life. The emerging concept of security appears frequently essential also for ensuring international peace after an IAC. Indeed, the increasing internationalisation and globalisation of human life often implies the achievement and guarantee of durable peace conditions, inspired by the mentioned concept of security, also in neighbouring countries and even in remote ones.

In view of this more recent perspective, PKO are expected to answer multifaceted responsibilities and diverse tasks. Unlike in their traditional role, they must acquire the ability to perform new functions besides military ones. In other words, they must acquire and/or avail themselves of the complex expertise necessary to ensure lasting peace based on human security according to the newly affirmed meaning of these expressions. Consequently, the launching of a PKO most frequently implies the participation of a plurality of actors whose competences and functions are not of a military nature, but rather concern the protection of individuals, the establishment (or re-establishment) of democratic institutions, the promotion of the rule of law through advice on legislation and the provision of appropriate law enforcement structures and procedures, and the implementation of human rights standards of protection enshrined in international legal instruments. While the activity of all these actors may be functionally coordinated by the military command of the PKO, each non-military unit normally receives instructions from and answers to the organization that seconded it, thus keeping a certain degree of autonomy within the structure of the operation.

4. Human security and EU peace missions

This new context of security that has led to the affirmation of human security has allowed the European Union (EU) to progressively increase its participation in PKO. While the UN on the universal level and NATO on the regional level continue to act as the leading organizations implied in PKO as far as their military goals are concerned, there is a significant role for other organizations having a lower standing in military activities to contribute to their success by exercising their additional non-military functions. This does not exclude, however, that such organizations may also give a military contribution where their statutes so permit.

That is the situation of the EU, which pursues its political, economic and social goals mainly through diplomatic, legislative and administrative actions, but progressively elaborated a new 'European security strategy' to face security threats and challenges for which inevitably a global player must be ready to share responsibility, where the rule of law and public security may also be guaranteed by the use of military capabilities. Following the European Coun-

cil's agreement on a European security strategy in 2003,¹² the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities proposed a "Human Security Doctrine" for Europe with a view to addressing human security as referring to freedom for individuals from basic insecurities caused by gross human rights violations.¹³ For operations in situations of severe insecurity, the doctrine suggested a set of principles, including the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force. The last one was to be carried out by a "Human Security Response Force" composed of 15.000 men and women, of whom at least one third would be civilians, such as police, human rights monitors, development and humanitarian specialists, and administrators.

It is interesting to note, in this regard, that the principles controlling military operations reflect a notion of human security which is largely inspired by human rights considerations. According to the Barcelona report, while the use of force is justifiable if there is legal authority to intervene (*jus ad bellum*) and the goals are worthwhile, "the methods adopted must also be appropriate and, indeed, may affect the ability to achieve the goal specified. In other words, the 'how' is as important as the 'why'. This means that the right to life, the right to housing, or the right to freedom of opinion are to be respected and protected even in the midst of conflict. Unless it is absolutely necessary and it has a legal basis, personnel deployed on human security missions must avoid killing, injury, and material destruction. Human security implies that everyone is treated as a citizen".¹⁴

As mentioned, the report's authors are aware that this approach has far-reaching implications for military tactics and may affect the ability to achieve the goal specified, but put forward the justification that "in human security operations, protection of civilians, not defeating an enemy, is an end in itself". Hence, minimum force is the key. They are also aware that the use of minimal and precise force in human security operations "puts troops at more immediate risk than using overwhelming force", and recognizes that operations conducted under this principle are more akin to the traditional approach of the police than to that of regular military forces sent in combat. The authors also concede that this logic may spur disagreement,¹⁵ but trust that "it should be appreciated by the military, the politicians and the general public".¹⁶

¹² See the European document *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

¹³ See *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe. The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities*, Barcelona, 15 September 2004, at p. 12.

¹⁴ *Supra* fn. 13, at p. 15.

¹⁵ See e.g. the considerations of I.H. SIVA-J. GRÄNS, *The promotion of human security in EU security policies*, *INEX Policy Brief*, No. 7, 2010, at p. 5.

¹⁶ *Supra* fn. 13, at p. 20.

Whether this vision of human security remains intact after fifteen years from its definition may be a matter for discussion, the debate having later focused on the translation of the vision into action rather than on the improvement of the definition itself. The current Global Strategy for the EU Foreign and Security Policy¹⁷ appears to follow the principles elaborated in previous documents, but limits itself to a general reference to them and deals rather with specific actions taken or to be taken in the future, with a view to promoting peace and guaranteeing the security of its citizens and territory, by stressing that “internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders”.¹⁸ The focus on specific action is later shown in the conclusions adopted by the European Council in December 2016, which refer to the global strategy’s implementation through individual actions concerning internal security as well as external security and defence by confirming previous commitments in this respect,¹⁹ and calls for their comprehensive follow-up by the High Representative and Member States.

Therefore, while the question whether the actions taken perfectly matches the principles of human security elaborated by the EU may have to be assessed globally as well as on a case by case basis, the commitment to stick to those principles should be regarded as unaltered so far. As the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has recently recalled, “security challenges today cannot really be faced effectively with a purely and exclusively military approach”, and “investing [...] in resilience, in human rights, democracy, good governance, jobs, education [...] investing in this, which is the European way, is also an investment in our security”.²⁰

¹⁷ See European Council, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy*, June 2016.

¹⁸ *Supra* fn. 18, at p. 7.

¹⁹ See European Council, doc. 34/16, 15 December 2016, par. 10-11, also recalling the Council conclusions of 14 November 2017 on the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, Doc. 14392/16.

²⁰ See European Commission, *Speech by Federica Mogherini at the 53rd Munich Security Conference*, 17 February 2017, at p. 2.

| Andrea Romussi * |
*Italy, Peacebuilding
and Post-conflict Reconstruction:
The Italian Experience in Afghanistan*

SUMMARY: 1. Political Advisor and Regional NATO Senior Civilian Representative. – 2. Fostering governance and development in Western Afghanistan. – 3. Lesson learned.

1. *Political Advisor and Regional NATO Senior Civilian Representative*

Operating in a non-permissive area which is as big as northern Italy, ISAF Coalition troops in Western Afghanistan (consisting of ten different nations) ran four lines of operations (LOOs): security, training, stability (governance and development), and rule of law. The “Main Effort”, theater-wide, was in the south/south west (Helmand), whereas in Western Afghanistan we were operating in the so-called “Economy of Forces”, and the operations were mainly carried out along Highway 1 (also known as “Ring Road”), according to a people-centric approach. Cooperation agencies, international organizations offices, and other forms of civilian presence (i.e. NGOs), apart from rare exceptions, were active in the four provinces’ main cities and centers, mainly along the Ring Road. The role of Political Advisor/Polad (OF-5 in the NATO ranking system) and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative/SCR (OF-6 in the NATO ranking system), with the respective differences having been considered, were mainly about how to positively influence the non-kinetic LOOs and monitor the security operations to better understand their political, economic, and social impact.

The Polad, as a member of the special staff to the Regional Command-West/RC-W Commander (always a brigadier general of the Italian Army), advised and reported directly to commander himself. The NATO SCR, at the central level, promoted the Alliance’s political-military objectives in Afghani-

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stan, in coordination with the Afghan Government, the civil society, and the representatives of both the international community and neighboring countries. He provided advice to the North Atlantic Council on how to best ensure the general coherence of the relationship between the Alliance and Afghanistan, including the burden of shaping an adequate perception of NATO to the wider public. He played a central role in coordinating with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan/UNAMA, and other relevant international stakeholders. Directly designated by the NATO Secretary General, the SCR maintained a direct channel with the former.

At the regional level, the SCR Office that I led for two years in the west of the country accomplished the following tasks: 1) ensured a coordination with the superior office in Kabul, through reciprocal visits and weekly video teleconference/VTC with the participation of all the regional SCRs; 2) pursued information sharing, coordination, and mutual support with the Regional Command – West, whose Headquarters was located inside the Forward Support Base/FSB, in Herat. In particular, an osmotic relation was established with the RC-W Commander, the Stability branch (CJ9) and the Italian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Herat Province. Daily contacts were established with the Fusion Center, the Public Information Office /PIO, and some other assets such as the Police Advisory Teams/PATs and Military Advisory Teams/MATs (Carabinieri and Army); 3) promoted coordination with the local Afghan authorities and with the representatives of the International community in the provinces. The Office of NATO SCR in the Western Region comprised also three Advisors (one for Political, one for Economic and one for Transition issues), as well as a Close Protection Team/CPT of eight Italian Carabinieri Paratroopers from the “Tuscania Regiment”. In summary, the roles of the Polad and the NATO SCR for Western Afghanistan were qualitatively different, although both performed similar tasks to a certain degree. The former had mainly an internal role in RC-W Headquarters; the latter enjoyed an external projection and was pairing on every occasion with the RC-W Commander.

2. Fostering governance and development in Western Afghanistan

Western Afghanistan covers an area of 160,000 km², divided into four provinces, with a total population of approximately 3.5 million.

Herat is also known as “the XXXII Iranian province”, for the strong cultural, social, and economical influence emanating from the neighboring western country. Herat generates a significant portion of the country’s custom revenues, mainly through the border crossing point of Islam Qalah, and it has one of the most vibrant economies of the country: a factor that draws the attention of legitimate, as well as malignant, actors. The geographical distance

from Kabul does not prevent Herat from playing a prominent role in the country's political and economic dynamics.

Farah: populated prevalently by ethnic Pashtun, it has always proved to be the most problematic province of the Area of Operations/AOR: insurgent activities in many of its districts made it sometimes inaccessible by the Afghan authorities and security forces themselves. Its opium production placed Farah second only to Helmand, according to the United Nations Office of Drug and Crime/UNODC report in 2013; Badghis, in the North, bordering with Turkmenistan, is poor and with the highly unstable, insurgent ridden, Murghab valley; Ghor is characterized by very wild valleys surrounded by mountains, and thus isolated, with basically no infrastructures, especially paved roads. That is where the Hindu Kush begins. The main tools available for the Stability LOO were the following: 1) Key Leader Engagement (KLE), meaning a consolidated and elaborated dialogue with the legitimate local authorities, such as the Provincial Governors; the Presidents of the Provincial Councils, which are the only elected organs at the provincial level; representatives of line ministries; district managers; and public prosecutors; 2) the PRTs, which operated through their Quick Impact Projects, i.e. small projects like hospital wings, schools, wells, culverts among others. Such projects have always been agreed upon according to the needs outlined by the Afghan provincial and district authorities, based on the "Afghan First" principle.

Such principle, apart from encapsulating the Afghan priorities, materialized also with the employment of local Afghan engineers, and the contracting of local small and medium size Afghan companies. In over a decade of activity, for instance, the Italian PRT in Herat developed around 350 QIPs, for a total value of around 40 million Euro. Others PRTs were the Spanish one in Qaleh-ye-Now (Badghis), the Lithuanian one in Chaghcharan (Ghor), and the US in Farah. The main infrastructural projects for the Herat province, like the Herat bypass (worth around 40 million Euro), the civilian airport of Herat (almost 100 million Euro) and the Herat – Chest-e-Sharif road (approximately 70 million Euro), were being implemented by the Italian Cooperation Agency: these were long – term projects that in some cases are still ongoing. I remember inaugurating together with the former Provincial Governor of Herat, Dr. Daud Shah Saba, the beginning of the Herat Bypass works, back in Spring 2013; 3) the Development and Governance Working Group: it was a forum that allowed a structured exchange of information with the Afghan authorities coming from the four provinces, and enabled them, at the local level, to make their voice heard in Kabul, for instance on budgetary issues. One of the main concerns, in fact, was that money did not flow from the center to the periphery. Cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, together with the lack of communications between Kabul and the periphery were at the origin of such stalemate. We echoed and channeled such request in our regular VTCs with the NATO SCR in Kabul, and on the occasion

of reciprocal visits. Such message was conveyed through the military chain of command as well. The combined political pressure, especially in Kabul, yielded results and the flow of funds for some line Ministries' representatives did materialize; 4) Stakeholders meetings: organized by the Deputy Chief of Staff/DCOS for Stability and the CJ9 branch, they were held monthly in different locations, mainly in Camp Arena, but not exclusively.

Those were meetings instrumental to information sharing on projects that were being implemented by international stakeholders. It was a very useful forum also for avoiding duplication of efforts. Beyond ISAF representatives, there were representatives of UNAMA, who had the widest network of presence also outside the main centers; USAID, the Italian Cooperation, the ICRC, as well as the U.S. Consulate and the German Consulate. Active in Herat were also the Pakistani, Indian, and obviously, the Iranian Consulates, although we had limited, non-bilateral contacts with them.

3. *Lesson learned*

In Western Afghanistan, much like elsewhere in the country, in the past 12 to 15 years, the classic *indicators of growth have been steadily on the rise: life expectancy; economic growth; literacy rate; access to the health system*. Let's take one indicator: School enrollment, for instance. It has increased from 1 million in 2002 to around 8.7 million for general education in 2016, with a girl population of 39 percent. These figures are even higher if we consider the city of Herat, where around half of the University student population are girls. These achievements have been possible thanks to a more secure environment, to which the ISAF Mission has substantially contributed, together with the growing capacities and capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces/ANSF. These improvements have been particularly marked in Herat Province, where the local governance has been very competent and committed, operating in a relatively open, productive, and trade oriented society.

By contrast, we found a substantially different situation in rural areas, more isolated, poor in infrastructures, and more exposed also to the influence of insurgents. So, progress, under many viewpoints, has indeed been achieved. The period that I am considering is mainly from 2011 to 2013, when the Transition Process mostly took place. ISAF Mission and other international actors redoubled their effort to increasingly empower the Afghan counterparts. 2011 was the year of the US surge: 100,000 boots on the ground from the US only. The Transition Process was based on solid and realistic benchmarks, verified by several sources of information (*Civil Military Coordination/CIMIC* components of maneuver Task Forces, as well as the PRTs, always in cooperation with local authorities). Part of the problem then, was that the drawdown of US

forces started basically immediately after their reached the peak of their presence throughout Afghanistan.

It is a commonly shared understanding that the Transition Process should have been more condition-based and less time-driven. I am personally convinced, based on my experience, that the Transition Process, as it has been carried out, was somehow a good way of helping the Afghans. The problem is that the objectives we pursued through the Transition process, as the recent developments clearly indicates, were fragile and should have been consolidated in a more convincing way by the international community.

Another assumption that we thought should have occurred, and that was discussed bearing in mind the elapsing time of the Transition process, was the increased presence of civilian cooperating agencies, as the ISAF Mission was drawing down. Neither the country, nor its Western Region, achieved a secure enough environment to allow for a growing non-military international presence. With the gradual redeployment of the ISAF coalition forces and the growing role of the ANSF increasingly in the lead of operations, the security situation did not improve.

The ANSF proved to be still fragile and in need of support, that in many cases was in fact there: let's think of the spectrum of critical enablers such as Close Air Support/CAS, both fixed and rotary, Medical Evacuation/MEDEVAC, Counter-IED capabilities that mainly the US, but not only, provided well beyond 2014. Still, for instance, the redeployment of Police and Military Advisory Teams, represented a blow to the much-needed consolidation process the ANSF were undergoing.

Attrition rate was yet another major obstacle, theater-wide. From the viewpoint of achieving a more effective civilian-military cooperation, and thus stability operations, I underline the centrality of the "embedment" of the civilian component within the military structure, especially in a non-permissive environment. The embedment is crucial to foster a reciprocal level of understanding and cooperation between the civilians and the military. These are objectives difficult to achieve if the civilians are living outside the base and not getting the full spectrum of the civil-military activities carried out by the military.

The constant coordination with the RC-West Commanders and their main collaborators has proved to be essential to maximize the efforts and get a thorough and shared picture of the political dynamics of Western Afghanistan. This has proven to be true in understanding the asymmetric pace and level of information vis-à-vis the center and the periphery of the Area of Operations; the dynamics between formal and informal centers of power, and the multi-dimensional influence exerted by neighboring countries. The continuity (3 years of constant presence) helped to (partially) mitigate the recurring semi-annual rotations of the Italian military contingents.

Another positive development I detected is that the ISAF Mission in Herat increasingly showed consistency in conveying messaging to the local govern-

ance, to the chain of command (both in Kabul, and from there to the NATO HQ in Evere, and in Capitals) and, lastly, to the wider public back home. Fine tuning of public diplomacy messaging proved to be key for a consistent narrative and for valorizing what was being done to support the Afghans by all the International stakeholders: military, civilian cooperation agencies, international organizations offices, and NGOs.

Recognition of the full Afghan sovereignty, was an objective that the ISAF civilian military components jointly pursued and worked towards. Enabling the Afghans to take the lead of all the LOOs, and thus of their country's problems, was the basic, central concept of the Security Force Assistance/SFA. The main effort of the ISAF Mission was to provide adequate support to the ANSF, both in terms of advisors and enablers, to empower the Afghan Army and Police to gradually take the lead of security operations across the country.

From the political, stability viewpoint, the strategic choice has been to support the legitimate government representatives: the Provincial Governors, the Presidents of the Provincial Councils, the District Managers, the Prosecutors, and the representatives of Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG); It could have been possible instead to support and empower those who, in many cases, retained the real power behind the scenes (i.e. the warlords, like Ismail Khan in the West, after he stepped down as a Minister of Energy).

The former approach, though correct and morally sound, leaves room to some doubts when it comes to its effectiveness, an achievement that could have been obtained, certainly in the short term, should we have opted for the latter approach. Asked by several interlocutors what the formula of the Italian approach to the Stability operations was, I vividly remember several Afghan authorities, like the then Governor Saba, and the current President Ghani, who was then the Transition Adviser to the President Karzai, who commended on several occasions the job done by the Italians. Despite the diplomatic stance, they recognize the "Afghan First" approach and the openness to articulate and deepen a real dialogue with them.

As a final comment, on the wider picture, "success" in Afghanistan depends more on internal Afghan and regional geopolitical developments that were beyond the reach of ISAF, and now the Resolute Support Mission: a successful reconciliation process that would bring Afghan tribal and ethnic groups together behind a leadership that should be more representative and willing and able to carry out much needed reforms; a more constructive role of Pakistan, but also from other regional stakeholders, such as China and India. We are witnessing today some signs of such policy with the growing role played by regional actors in different fora, such as the "Heart of Asia".

SESSION 2

Peacekeeping and Regionals Models

(chair Stefania Rosini)*

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| Richard Caplan * |

Deployment of Peacekeeping Forces by Regional Organizations: Practical Issues

SUMMARY: 1. Comparative advantages and disadvantages of regional organizations. – 2. Practical issues (challenges). – 3. Conclusion.

While less prominent in the public's eye than the United Nations, regional organizations have grown in importance for the part they play in conflict management. In particular, regional organizations today are responsible for conducting a large proportion of peace operations worldwide, either as the sole or lead organization or as the junior partner.¹

According to Paul Williams, a leading scholar on regional peacekeeping, 13 regional organizations conducted a total of 65 peace operations in the period from 1946 to 2016.² It is worth noting the organizations in question to appreciate the wide geographic scope of regional peacekeeping actors: the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the UK Commonwealth, the European Community/European Union (EC/EU), the League of Arab States, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and five African organizations: the Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the treaty of Non-Aggression, Assistance, and Mutual Defense (ANAD) [made up of 7 African Francophone countries], the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), and the Economic

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¹ The term 'peace operations' is used here to refer to operations that entail the deployment of armed personnel (soldiers and police) and civilian personnel for the purpose of establishing and maintaining the peace in a conflict-affected state or territory. The term is used interchangeably with 'peacekeeping' although peace operations may also entail peace enforcement.


² P.D. WILLIAMS, *Global and Regional Peacekeepers*, Discussion Paper, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, September 2016, p. 1.

Community of Central African States (ECCAS). There is no region of the world, in other words, where regional organizations have not deployed forces in support of peace, especially when one considers that some organizations – notably NATO and the EU – have conducted ‘out of area’ operations.

As already indicated, regional peacekeeping does not necessarily entail the engagement of regional organizations only; the United Nations, coalitions of states, and states individually often work in association with regional organizations. Examples of partnership and cooperation in regional peace operations include: the OAS and the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), ECOWAS and the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, the EU and the UN in Chad, UN-AU cooperation in Mali and the Central African Republic, and the UK in support of the UN in Sierra Leone and France in support of the UN in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Some of these partnerships have been sequential – i.e., bridging operations; some have been joint or hybrid; and some have been more limited assistance missions.

Regional peacekeeping has been on the rise since the end of the Cold War. More and more regional organizations are engaging in peace operations and have conducted greater numbers of missions in the aftermath of the Cold War. As Williams observes, of the 65 regional peace operations conducted between 1946 and 2016, 48 – roughly 74 percent – took place after 1989.³

Number of Regional Peace Operations Since 1946



Reproduced from Paul Williams, ‘Global and Regional Peacekeepers’ (2016).

³ WILLIAMS, *op. cit.*, p. 3.